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 Can There Be Belief Without Evidence?*
 Sam Wilkinson
 Resumen
 Presento una concepción de la creencia (denominada "solo descendente"
 [downstream onlj^) de acuerdo con la cual puede haber creencia sin evidencia. Defiendo esta
 tesis en contra de dos influyentes objeciones. La primera objeción está fundamentada en
 la intuición de que la creencia "apunta hacia la verdad". La segunda de ellas dice que,
 puesto que hay estados que intuitivamente no son creencias, pero que explican la acción
 de la misma manera, necesitamos consideraciones de tipo ascendente [upstream] para dis-
 tinguir entre esas creencias y los estados que no son creencias.
 PALABRAS CLAVE: creencia, normas, evidenda, acáón, alief.
 Abstract
 I present a view of belief (called the "downstream-only view") according to which
 there can be belief without evidence. I defend it against two influential objections. The
 first objection is grounded in the intuition that belief "aims at truth". The second objec-
 tion is that, since there are states that intuitively aren't beliefs but that explain action in
 the same way, we need upstream considerations to tell these belief and non-belief states
 apart.
 KEYWORDS: Belief, Norms, Evidence, Action, Alief
 I. Introduction
 It is important from the outset to get clear on the nature of the title
 question. The question is not whether human beings are psychologically
 capable of belief without evidence, or whether there are actual instances
 of people believing without evidence. The question concerns whether
 the very concept of belief allows there to be such a thing as belief with-
 out evidence.
 Many theorists take there to be an essential relation between belief
 and evidence. Thus, cases that may look to us like instances of belief, but
 which lack the appropriate relations to evidence, fail to actually be in-
 stances of belief. Contrary to this popular view, I will present a view of
 13
This content downloaded from 144.173.224.37 on Wed, 17 Oct 2018 10:58:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 14 Sam Wilkinson
 belief (called the "downstream-only view", for reasons that will become
 clear) according to which there can be belief without evidence. I will
 then defend it against two influential objections.
 II. Revisionism and Conservatism about Belief
 As a preliminary, it is very important to distinguish between revision-
 ism and conservatism about belief. A conservative will take as a desideratum
 for a characterization of belief that it be in line with our actual practices
 of belief attribution. A revisionist, on the other hand, will deny this. Ra-
 ther, belief, in the relevant theoretical sense , is something with a clearly defin-
 able nature that is independent of our practices of belief attribution. As a
 result, there may be cases where we attribute beliefs, but the subject
 doesn't really believe what our attributions suggest.
 11.1. An Illustration of Revisionism
 A very strong, and explicit, example of revisionism about belief is
 to be found in the work of Ruth Barcan Marcus (most explicitly in her
 1995 paper). She claims that belief, in the relevant sense of central theo-
 retical importance, is a relation, not to sentences (or propositions con-
 ceived as sentence-like), but to possible states of affairs, and, as a result,
 she claims that one cannot believe the impossible.1 This is deeply revi-
 sionist since we commonly can ascribe impossible beliefs to others. For
 example, mistaken beliefs about identity are often ascribed as, "He be-
 lieves that Batman is not Bruce Wayne", and it is impossible (true in no
 possible worlds) that something should fail to be self-identical.2 But ac-
 cording to Marcus, no one can actually believe this, since you cannot stand
 in the belief relation to impossible states of affairs. Marcus instead explains
 away the mere appearance that people can believe the impossible.
 We will not need to take a stance on this tangential debate about
 believing the impossible. However, it is a nice illustration of what I mean
 by revisionism, namely, of our belief attributions coming apart from ac-
 tual instances of belief in some theoretically important sense.
 11.2. A.n Illustration of Conservatism
 Lisa Bortolo tti's book, Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (2009), is
 devoted to defending the claim that delusions are beliefs. Her tactic is to
 present those who deny that delusions are beliefs (so-called "anti-
 doxasticists") with a dilemma: if we are to deny belief-status to delusions,
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 then we are going to have to do the same for many states that, intuitive-
 ly, we are happy to think of as beliefs. Among these "mental states that
 we are happy to regard as typical beliefs" [Bortolotti (2009), p. 57], she
 cites, in particular, the sort of biased hypothesis-testing we commonly
 get in scientific beliefs [Ibid., p. 148] and also the unrevisability of racist
 [Ibid, p.150] and religious [Ibid. p. 152] beliefs. Note that this argument is
 based on the suggestion that denying belief-status to these non-
 pathological states, that we normally attribute as beliefs, is too great a
 cost. In other words, it takes as a desideratum for a theoretical character-
 ization of belief that it should align itself with the beliefs that we attrib-
 ute on a daily basis. A characterisation of beliefs that denies belief-status
 to delusions also has as a consequence that religious, scientific and racist
 beliefs are not "really" beliefs, and this is an unacceptable consequence.
 This is clearly conservative in the sense just mentioned, namely, since it
 takes our actual belief attributions as a guide for what is to actually count
 as belief.
 This is an intuitively appealing strategy. However, note that the an-
 ti-doxasticist can counter such a strategy by affirming a revisionism
 about belief, and simply question that denying belief-status to, e.g., cer-
 tain religious "beliefs", is too great a cost. The anti-doxasticist might say,
 as Ruth Barcan Marcus has, that it may turn out that many of the times
 that we regularly attribute beliefs to others, we are wrong and they are
 not, strictly speaking, believing in the proper, revised, sense. Further-
 more, one might think that this is a perfecdy acceptable, or even attrac-
 tive, consequence of a philosophical theory of belief. What is philosophy
 for, after all, if not to regiment and revise our pre-theoretical concepts?
 We may ascribe belief in a rough and ready way, but that doesn't mean
 that belief is a rough and ready phenomenon.
 II.3. Conservatism , Revisionism and Belief without Evidence
 Bortolotti's work nicely shows that, given the continuity (in particu-
 lar in terms of irrationality) between clinical delusions and non-
 pathological beliefs, if the anti-doxasticist position is going to be plausi-
 ble, one has to be a revisionist about belief. The same applies to those
 who deny the possibility of belief without evidence. To view things from
 the other direction, so to speak, someone who wants to claim that there
 is belief without evidence, and does so on the grounds that we attribute
 various forms of evidence-less beliefs (religious beliefs, delusions etc.) is
 open to the same revisionist move. It is argumentatively more efficacious
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 to show that one can be a revisionist, and allow for belief without evi-
 dence. As it happens, the position I want to present is precisely that.
 III. Belief: A Downstream-Only View
 In this section, I present the central view. It is that only "downstream
 considerations" are relevant in determining whether something is a belief
 or not. Given that relationships to evidence are upstream considerations,
 this means that a belief-like state can be without evidence and it could
 still be a belief, as long as it has the right consequences.
 III.l. Belief y Direction of Fit, and Maps
 What kinds of entities are at least candidate believers? One way of
 answering this question is by considering the teleological question:
 "What kinds of entities need something like belief?" One intuitive re-
 sponse is to say that organisms need information about the world, and
 hence are candidate believers. Not every organism is a believer, but the
 claim that organisms believe and, say, rocks don't is at least a start. Then
 we might want to narrow this down a bit further to organisms that
 move. Entities that have no means of operating in the world have no
 need for an informational view of it. Then we might want to narrow it
 down further to organisms that move autonomously in the service of
 their goals. Animals navigate environmental features in the service of
 their goals, and presumably they do so by having some kind of infor-
 mation about the world, perhaps even something we could characterize
 as an informational perspective on the world.3
 Frank Ramsey (1931) put belief precisely in these terms. He called
 beliefs "the maps whereby we steer".4 This metaphor of beliefs as being
 like maps that help us through the world in the service of our goals is ex-
 tremely useful. In particular, it picks out an opposition between the phe-
 nomenon of belief (viz. the map) and the phenomenon of desire (viz. the
 goal). The former involves taking the world to be a certain way, whereas
 the latter involves wanting it to be a certain way. This picks out a funda-
 mental distinction between information and motivation.
 This opposition between belief (information) and desire (motiva-
 tion) has sometimes been put in terms of "direction of fit" (which in
 turn is derived from speech act theory, where it was used to elucidate the
 difference between assertions and commands). The first use of the term
 "direction of fit" was by J.L. Austin (1962), and was not in fact used to
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 pick out this distinction at all.5 His student, John Searle, picked up the
 terminology, and used it to pick out a distinction that he claims is best il-
 lustrated in Anscombe (who, in fact, did not use the "direction of fit"
 terminology). Searle's merging of Austin's terminology and Anscombe's
 example has stuck, and has been picked up by various philosophers
 since. The example Searle (1979) takes from Anscombe is one that dis-
 tinguishes a shopping list, from a detective's record of what the man do-
 ing the shopping is buying:
 ...if the [shopping] list and the things that the man actually buys do not
 agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake in not
 in the list but this man's performance (if his wife were to say: "Look, it says
 butter and you have bought margarine", he would hardly reply: "What a
 mistake! We must put that right, and alter the word on the list to "marga-
 rine"): whereas if the detective's record and what the man actually buys do
 not agree then the mistake is in the record [Anscombe (1957), p. 56].
 So, the shopping list, which has a "world-to-word" direction of fit, is anal-
 ogous to a desire, which has a "world-to-mind" direction of fit. The detec-
 tive's inventory, which has a "mind-to-world" direction of fit, is analogous
 to a belief, which has a mind-to-world direction of fit. It is in the nature of
 belief to fit with how things stand in the world. If there is a disparity, it is
 the "fault" of the belief, so to speak. Conversely, it is in the nature of de-
 sire to motivate one to behave in such a way that will make the world fit
 with it. If there is a disparity, it is the "fault" of the world, so to speak.
 Although this example is nice for illustrating direction of fit, I find
 Ramsey's map metaphor more useful for understanding the essence of
 belief.6 Note that the shopping list and the inventory both have the same
 format: both are lists, with discrete linguistic items. This suggests both a
 format for belief, and a similarity in format between belief and desire,
 neither of which I find plausible. Firsdy, you have beliefs all the time, ef-
 fordessly, about everything you perceptually encounter. To put it another
 way, you are not (usually) informationally neutral about the things that
 you encounter. You are, however, motivationally neutral about the vast
 majority of what you encounter. We have appetites and goals. However,
 the vast majority of things (in the broadest sense to include objects and
 states of affairs) that we encounter aren't the objects of those goals.
 Some of them might well be relevant to attaining some goal or other;
 others won't even have that significance. Now consider the aptness of
 the map analogy. Suppose you want to get to point X, and realise that
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 you'll need to take such and such a route, through a tunnel, over a bridge
 etc. These are things that impact on you getting to point X. However, in
 looking at the map, you will also expect to see a church here, a forest
 there. These may be irrelevant to you getting to point X, but you still
 take them to be there.
 Secondly, and in a related vein, beliefs are holistic, and necessarily
 subject to consistency in a way that desire doesn't seem to be. If I believe
 that you are shorter than 6ft, I will, by that same token, believe that you
 are shorter than 7ft, or 8ft etc. Maps, like beliefs, are holistic in this way.
 If there is a boundary between a forest and a field, and I update it on the
 map, making the forest bigger, I thereby make the field smaller. We do
 however seem to have conflicting desires all the time. I want to taste my
 friend's delicious chocolate brownies, but I know that they'll make me
 fat and I don't want to get fat. That's when decision-making gets tough.
 Granted, there are cases where believing in humans isn't maximally con-
 sistent. It is arguably, however, not possible for it to be direcdy contradictory
 (and in cases where it appears to be so, this can be explained away).
 Furthermore, note that a map also has a map-to-world direction of
 fit. If there is a mismatch, it is the map's "fault". So the map analogy pre-
 serves the insight of direction of fit, without the infelicities of the list
 analogy that we have just mentioned.
 III.2. Two Notions of Direction of Fit
 Direction of fit has been used in two slighdy different ways, and it
 is important to disambiguate. According to one, direction of fit distin-
 guishes the informational from the motivational ' whereas according to the
 other, it distinguishes the cognitive from the conative. Sometimes these two
 oppositions are taken to be equivalent, but an illustration of the two dis-
 tinctions will clarify the difference.
 Velleman (1992) uses direction of fit in the second sense:
 The term "direction of fit" refers to the two ways in which attitudes can
 relate propositions to the world. In cognitive attitudes, a proposition is
 grasped as patterned after the world; whereas in conative attitudes, the
 proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow. The proposi-
 tional object of desire is regarded not as fact - not, that is, as factum , hav-
 ing been brought about - but rather as faciendum , to be brought about: it's
 regarded not as true but as to be made true [Velleman (1992), p. 8].
 The sense of "regarded" in "regarded as true", is a weak sense. As a result,
 Velleman's sense of "cognitive" includes any representational states that
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 present the world as being a certain way, regardless of whether the subject actually
 takes it to be that way . Thus, Velleman includes under the class of states or
 attitudes that are "cognitive", and hence have mind-to-world direction of
 fit, states like perceptions, hypotheses, fantasies, imaginings etc. Indeed an
 attitude can have that direction of fit, and persist, even if the subject is to-
 tally aware of the mismatch between the state and the world (for example,
 when I'm imagining, or hallucinating, yet fully aware that I am).
 The other use of "direction of fit" distinguishes, not the cognitive
 from the conative, but the informational from the motivational. This is
 the sense of direction of fit that John Searle has in mind. One very nice
 characterisation of it is by Michael Smith (1987). I cite it in full, and it
 rewards close reading.
 ...the difference between beliefs and desires in terms of direction of fit
 comes down to a difference between the counterfactual dependence of a
 belief and a desire that p , on a perception of not p' roughly, a belief that p is
 a state that tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception
 that not p , whereas a desire that p is a state that tends to endure, disposing
 a subject to bring it about that p. Thus, we may say, attributions of beliefs
 and desires require that different kinds of counterfactuals are true of the
 subjects to whom they are attributed. We may say that that is what a dif-
 ference in their direction of fit is [Smith (1987), p.54].
 Such a use of direction of fit seems to define belief, qua basic information-
 al state, in terms of direction of fit. Therefore, unlike Velleman's use of
 "direction of fit", states like imaginings, hypotheses etc. do not have a
 mind-to-world direction of fit.7
 I will follow Searle, Smith, and others, in using direction of fit in
 this way, and in characterising belief in terms of the informational, un-
 derstood as that which has a mind-to-world direction of fit in his sense.
 Another way of expressing the same thing as this sense of mind-to-world
 direction of fit is in terms of transparency. This is a term that gets used in
 various different ways, but the way in which I want to use it is as an ex-
 pression of mind-to-world direction of fit. Beliefs are, by their nature,
 tied to (or simply are a function of) how the world is as far as the agent is
 concerned. As Gareth Evans puts it, belief is "directed outwards." If you
 discover that p isn't the case, you ipso facto cannot belief that p.s This is
 the same as direction of fit, since a belief that p will "go out of existence
 in the presence of a perception that not p ". Imagination that p is not
 transparent in this sense, and can certainly remain in existence "in the
 presence of a perception that not p'
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 This has various revealing consequences for questions concerning
 whether you believe something. Let us contrast this with two other men-
 tal phenomena, for example, with desire (which has a world-to-mind di-
 rection of fit) or with an emotion (which pńma fade has no direction of
 fit). If I ask you whether you are angry at the moment, you will need to
 assess yourself, for example, what you are feeling. However, if I ask you
 whether you believe that p (in the philosophical sense of "believe") you
 don't, or at least shouldn't (unless you take me to be using "belief' in the
 everyday sense), look at yourself, as if trying to accurately describe an in-
 ternal state (as you might with anger). Rather you simply ask yourself
 whether p .9 This is obvious for perceptual beliefs, but it also extends to
 non-perceptual beliefs. If you ask me whether I believe that Paris is the
 capital of France, I ask myself whether Paris is the capital of France, not
 whether I believe it.10 I examine the world, not myself. Belief is directed
 outwards, namely at the state of affairs that would make it true or accu-
 rate. These "outward" states of affairs can obviously include states of af-
 fairs involving one's body, and one's "self', e.g. one's personality.
 So, belief is the basic informational state, believing is the basic in-
 formational phenomenon, and this involves taking the world to be a cer-
 tain way. The question that interests us here is: What does one have to
 do (in the weakest sense of "do") in order to count as taking the world
 to be a certain way? It is with this question in mind that I present my re-
 visionist view about the norms of belief. For lack of a better name, I call
 it a "Downstream-only View".
 III. 3. Evaluative and Constitutive Norms
 In order to answer the question of whether there can be belief
 without evidence, it is crucial to distinguish between evaluative and con-
 stitutive norms; in other words, distinguish between doing <|) badly or
 well (evaluative) versus doing (1) and not doing <() at all (constitutive).11 In
 this instance, (j)-ing is believing, and those who deny that there can be be-
 lief without evidence are claiming that this is breaking constitutive norms
 of belief. Something has gone so badly wrong (or wrong in such a way)
 that the subject is not longer believing at all.12 In spite of her utterances,
 the subject doesn't actually believe what she might seem to believe.
 To get a grasp of the distinction between evaluative and constitu-
 tive norms, consider an analogy with chess (a real favourite among phi-
 losophers).13 If, during a game of chess, I move so that my queen can be
 captured by my opponent with impunity (and as a result she gains an
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 enormous material advantage and goes on to win the game) that is a bad
 chess move. An evaluative norm (the norm of playing chess well) is bro-
 ken. If I move my bishop like a rook, however, that's not a chess move at
 all, let alone a bad one. A constitutive norm (dictated by the rules of chess)
 is thereby broken. Those who want to deny the possibility of evidenceless
 belief think that it's like the latter. I think that it's like the former.14
 IIIŠ3. Functional Koles and Norm-Breaking
 Let us consider what is typically seen as the functional role of be-
 lief. Beliefs are typically taken to:
 (i) Be supported by evidence in their initial formation,
 (ii) be open to review in the face of contrary evidence and
 (iii) guide action and reasoning.
 Now, let us think of the functional role in terms of norms, and failure to
 fulfil those norms as being instances of breaking norms, namely, norms
 dictated by how a good belief ought (evaluative) or any belief must (con-
 stitutive) function. The norms (i)-(iii) divide into "upstream" and "down-
 stream" norms. That beliefs are supported by evidence in their initial
 formation, and are responsive to review in the face of contrary evidence,
 constitute upstream norms, namely, norms that are related to causal or
 evidential precursors of the belief ((ii) may seem to be a downstream
 norm, since it is something that is exhibited after the belief has been
 formed, but since in attempting to correct the delusion, you are provid-
 ing input for new judgement it is in fact upstream). That beliefs guide ac-
 tion or subsequent reasoning, i.e. (iii) is a downstream norm (namely,
 norms that govern the consequences of the subject's belief). Note that
 any belief-like state (like the religious commitment that "God is three
 and God is one") can be divided in this way. We can talk of how the
 subject came to be in such a state (upstream), and the use that the sub-
 ject makes of the state (downstream).
 Given what we have said about beliefs transparent, map-like na-
 ture, what can we say about upstream and downstream considerations
 and their role in determining whether something is a belief? In other
 words, which of (i-iii) are constitutive norms, and which are evaluative? I
 suggest that there is a very simple pattern. Upstream norms are evalua-
 tive, whereas downstream norms are constitutive.
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 This claim, as we are about to see, is certainly controversial among
 philosophers, but it is ultimately correct and defensible. To reiterate: the
 claim is that, whereas upstream considerations are relevant for telling us
 whether the subject is believing well or badly, they are not relevant for
 telling us whether the subject is believing at all. In other words, to move
 back from talk of norms to talk of functional role, these upstream issues
 about sensitivity to evidence describe the functional role of good belief,
 not belief tout court .
 This is, rather obviously, called the "Downstream-only View" because
 it is the view that a mental state (or propositional attitude) can be formed in
 any old way, but as long as it has the right kinds consequences (namely for
 action and dispositions for action) the state qualifies as a belief. Indeed the
 idea of a mad scientist manipulating your brain so as to "implant" a certain
 belief is not prima fade ruled out by our philosophical concept of belief.15
 This would be a prime case of irrational (or perhaps non-rational, depending
 on how you cash out epistemic irrationality) belief, but nonetheless it would
 count as belief, for example, if it were acted upon in the right way.16
 Returning to the map metaphor, if we want to know whether the
 subject is using a map-like drawing as a map, we need to look at the sub-
 ject's dispositions to behave in accordance with the drawing. The pres-
 ence of "disposition" is important, for, as we touched upon, there may
 be parts of the map, say distant parts, that are irrelevant to the subject's
 goal-directed navigation, but the subject can still take them to be accu-
 rate, and this is shown by the fact that if the subject were to be in those
 distant parts, he would use the map to navigate (e.g. would expect a river
 here, a mountain there). If, for some reason, the map was drawn using a
 bad method (analogue: unjustified belief) or a good method but which
 unfortunately went awry and was consequendy inaccurate (analogue: un-
 luckily false belief), then the map is a bad map, but still used as a map if
 the subject is inclined to navigate by it. Recall that it is merely a eta-
 phor: I am not saying that belief is a map, or even necessarily map-like in
 format. However, the notions of maps and navigation are useful ways to
 think about belief and the metaphor is particularly useful here, in the
 sense that the sort of questions that we ask for ascertaining whether
 something is being used as map, are the same sorts of questions that we
 ask to ascertain if something is a belief.17
 III.4. Two Objections to the Downstream Only View
 We have presented the downstream-only view. However, it is open
 to two compelling, but ultimately isguided, objections. The first objec-
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 tion is an objection from strong normativism. This objection is essential-
 ly a straightforward contradiction of the downstream-only view, which is
 grounded in the intuition that belief "aims at truth". The second objec-
 tion is the objection from alternative explanations. Belief can't simply be
 about dispositions to actions, since there are other states that intuitively
 aren't beliefs but that explain action in the same way. Hence we need up-
 stream considerations to tell these belief and non-belief states apart. I
 will present and respond to these two objections in turn in sections IV
 and V respectively.
 IV. Objection 1 : Strong Normativism and Aiming at Truth
 The objection from strong normativism involves the claim that be-
 lief, by its nature, "aims at truth", or is constitutively subject to the "truth
 norm". We can break up this objection into three steps:
 1. Beliefs, by their nature, aim at truth.
 2. Aiming at truth is an upstream consideration (failing to aim at the
 truth infringes an upstream norm).
 3. Therefore the downstream-only view is mistaken
 I will state my response to this first, and then flesh it out. It is as follows.
 1 is ambiguous, in particular with regards to the notion of "aiming
 at truth". In one sense of "aiming at truth", 1 is true. However, in the
 sense in which 1 is true, 2 is false. Conversely, in the sense in which 2 is
 true, 1 is false. Namely, once "aiming at truth" is conceived as an up-
 stream consideration, it ceases to be constitutive of belief. I will now
 flesh this out by looking at some interpretations of 1 .
 IV. 1. Believers "aim at truth" in Believing
 So, in what sense can we mean that belief, by its nature, aims at
 truth? Well, let's start by highlighting what cannot be meant by this.
 What cannot be meant by this is that the believer, in believing, liter-
 ally, direcdy, tries to have beliefs that are true. This can't be true because
 belief is involuntary. The believer can't aim at anything in believing, or at
 least not directly. If one is not convinced that belief is involuntary (alt-
 hough in my view, one should), there is another argument against this
 reading of the truth-aim claim, which doesn't rely on involuntarism (but
 which does provide indirect support for it). If the truth-aim claim is seen
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 as an aim that can actually guide the subject's beliefs then it suffers from
 the following problem (due to Gluer and Wikforss (2010)). Consider other
 norms or aims that guide behaviour. For example, consider a rule that a
 stock-market trader might use: "buy low and sell high". In order for this to
 actually guide the subject, the subject needs a belief about the current state
 of the stock market (namely, that what one is considering buying or selling
 is low or high). Now consider the norm: "Only believe something if it is
 true". In order for this to guide belief formation, you already need to have
 a belief about whether the thing in question is true. But then you already
 have a belief about the matter in question. Therefore the norm "comes too
 late" to guide belief. Needless to say, this falls out of transparency. And in-
 voluntarism also falls, in turn, naturally out of this, since belief is not an ac-
 tion, not something that the agent does (and hence not something the
 agent can be guided in doing), but rather a precondition for action.
 IV.2. Believers "aim at truth" by Regulating for Truth
 Perhaps what is meant is something more regulative. So, to think of
 an analogy, I can't direcdy control my cholesterol, but I can aim at lower-
 ing my cholesterol indirecdy by observing a cholesterol-lowering diet.
 Similarly, with belief, I can't direcdy try to believe things that are true,
 but I can aim at truth indirecdy by observing good epistemic practice, for
 example, by not interpreting or gathering evidence in a biased way etc.
 However, although this is now a coherent way of understanding the
 truth-aim claim as something that the subject aims for, namely, she aims
 for it in a regulative way, we now plausibly lose the constitutive force of the
 claim. And the claim is supposed to tell us what is constitutive of belief.
 What we now have is rather an evaluative, rather than constitutive norm.
 Biased evidence gathering, failure to "regulate" for truth, leads to bad be-
 lieving, but not to failure to believe altogether.18
 What we might say, however, is that it is constitutive of belief to have
 certain evaluative norms. This seems plausible. But then it is not constitu-
 tive that the believer aim at truth, but rather that she ought to. The conse-
 quences that this has for a belief-like state that is the product of biased
 reasoning, or that is poorly grounded, or unresponsive to evidence, is
 that this is believing that is bad, that the subject ought not to have, but it
 is still belief. This is perfecdy consistent with a downstream-only view.
 IV. 3 Belief qua mental state "aims at truth "
 One last interpretation, which follows on from what we have just
 said, is that belief itself the mental state, in some metaphorical sense aims
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 at truth. This avoids problems about involuntarism, and about the norm
 coming "too late". So, what is meant by this metaphor? We can see it all
 the more clearly when we compare it to other cognitive mental states (by
 "cognitive" I mean, as before, as opposed to "conative": the world is
 represented as being a certain way rather than to be made that way).
 Consider a contrasting cognitive state of choice, viz. imagining. An
 imagining that misrepresents the world, or is not grounded in evidence,
 is not "bad" in any way. One can say that this is because imagining (the
 state itself) is under no "obligation" to "aim at truth".19 What this seems
 to suggest is that it is not the believer who aims at truth but in some
 metaphorical sense, the state itself which by its very nature "aims at truth"
 (and that in turn constitutively entails an evaluative norm on the part of
 the believer). This falls out of the state's direction-of-fit, understood in
 the transparent, informational sense. If this claim is true, it is trivial and
 perfectly in keeping with a properly understood downstream-only view.
 Belief aims at truth insofar as it is how the subject takes the world to be,
 but it still doesn't strictly matter for belief-status how the subject came to
 take the world to be that way.
 One final ambiguity that needs ironing out, which is present, both
 in talk of "transparency" and "aiming at the truth", is whether we are
 talking about objective, de facto transparency or truth-aiming, or merely as
 far as the subject is concerned. I think it is fairly obvious that we mean the lat-
 ter.20 If we meant the former, we would have to deny belief-status to
 mistakes (fauldess, unlucky mistakes, as well as biases). And yet, mistakes
 get all their import from being doxastic, from being beliefs (which
 amounts to them being transparent). A mistake, a misrepresentation of
 reality in imagination, is not problematic because it isn't purporting to
 represent reality, and so typically wouldn't be acted upon in the service
 of relevant goals. So, to clarify, when we say that belief aims at truth, we
 mean truth as far as the subject is concerned. When we say that it is
 transparent, directed at the world, at reality, we mean the world, reality,
 as far as the subject is concerned. To use Ramsey's metaphor, we want to
 know what the subject's map is like, and an inaccurate map, even a sys-
 tematically inaccurate one, is still a map.
 IV.4. Recap of the Response to Objection 1
 As I mentioned, "aiming at the truth" is ambiguous. If this means
 that the agent aims at the truth, then either this makes no sense, if the
 aiming is supposed to happen directly, or it does make sense and is regu-
 lative. If it is regulative, it fails to be constitutive of belief. Another inter-
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 pretation of "aiming at truth" is that the state itself aims at truth. This is
 merely a consequence of its direction of fit, and is perfecdy in keeping
 with the downstream-only view.
 V. Objection 2: Non-Belief States Explain Actions
 This objection runs as follows. People often act in ways that are
 best explained in terms of states that aren't beliefs. How do we distin-
 guish these states from beliefs? The answer is: by using upstream consid-
 erations, such as their relationship to evidence etc. Therefore the
 downstream-only view is false.
 What are these non-belief states? We will divide them into two
 groups. In one group, let's place those that are referred to using pre-
 existing words in English. In another let's place those that are referred to
 using terms of art. I will examine these in order, and then respond to
 both together.
 V.l. Imagining Pretending and Believing
 The criticism goes as follows. There has to be more to belief than
 mere dispositions to action, since there are states that fall short of belief,
 like imaginings and pretendings, but which have similar behavioural con-
 sequences. Thus, when a child is having a pretend tea party, we don't at-
 tribute the belief that she's pouring tea, even though the behaviour is
 similar. We say that she is imagining that there is tea in the teapot, and
 engaged in pretence. We say similar things about actors on stage. We
 might say that what makes these cases of imagining and not belief is the
 way that they are related to evidence. The child is not believing that there
 is tea in the teapot since she can see that there isn't. If you were to try to
 correct the child's behaviour by pointing out that there is no tea in the
 teapot, she'd quite righdy be somewhat confused by your attempt to cor-
 rect her. This is because imagination and pretence are not responsive to
 evidence. One might think that beliefs, contrary to this, are thus respon-
 sive. If the child did believe that it was tea, and you pointed out that it
 was merely water, she might taste it, realise that you are right, and revise
 her beliefs. But the child is not believing. She is imagining or pretending.
 V.2. Alief and B imagining
 I'll introduce this with the opening example from Tamar Gendler's
 well-known paper. In March 2007, a glass walkway, suspended 4000 feet
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 above the Grand Canyon, was opened to the public. Most tourists struggle
 to make it to the centre of the walkway; others are paralyzed with vertigo.
 How should we describe the cognitive state of those who manage to stride
 to the Skywalk's center? Surely they believe that the walkway will hold: no one
 would willingly step onto a mile-high platform if they had even a scintilla of
 doubt concerning its stability. But alongside that belief there is something
 else going on. Although the venturesome souls wholeheartedly believe that
 the walkway is completely safe, they also alieve something very different. The
 alief has roughly the following content: "Really high up, long long way
 down. Not a safe place to be! Get offì!" [Gendler (2008a), p. 635]
 Gendler has used this and several other examples to motivate putting for-
 ward the well-received view that there are belief-like states, that are not be-
 liefs, but which have to be included into our taxonomy of mental states for
 explanatory reasons (of the same kind that motivate the presence of belief
 in such a taxonomy). Roughly, to have an alief is to have "an innate or ha-
 bitual propensity for a real or apparent stimulus to automatically activate a
 particular affective and behavioural repertoire, where the behavioral pro-
 pensities to which an alief gives rise may be in tension with those that arise
 from one's beliefs" [Gendler (2008b), p. 553]. Andy Egan (2009) posits a
 similar hybrid (or "in-between") state, "bimagination", to explain roughly
 similar phenomena (including delusions). Bimagination has some of the
 functional role of belief and some of the functional role of imagination: it
 is both action-guiding (and hence belief-like) but resistant also to counter-
 evidence (and hence imagination-like.)
 There has been some dispute about whether, and to what extent, alief
 is explanatorily necessary or helpful. In particular, critics, [see e.g. Mandel-
 baum (2013)] think that the relevant phenomena can be explained by be-
 liefs and desires coupled by interference from subpersonal processes (e.g.
 cued responses, conditioned or innate, to certain stimuli). Although I think
 my preferred view of belief (and its role in explanation) may be conducive
 to supporting such criticisms, such criticisms are not stricdy relevant to de-
 fending the downstream-only view. The point is, rather, that Gendler takes
 these cases, and her solution to these cases by using aliefs, to oppose, and
 cause serious problems for something she calls a "Neo-behaviorist view"
 [Gendler (2008a), p. 653]. Gendler characterizes such a view as follows:
 ... to believe that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to
 satisfy one's desires, whatever they are, in a world in which P (together
 with one's other beliefs) were true [Gendler (2008a), p. 652].
This content downloaded from 144.173.224.37 on Wed, 17 Oct 2018 10:58:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 28 Sam Wilkinson
 She says that the real problem for this view is that fact that "a wide range of
 attitudes - among them acceptance (Bratman), imagination (Currie, Vel-
 leman) and pretense (Doggett & Egan, Velleman) - may motivate P-
 concordant behavior" [Ibid., p. 653]. She wants to add herself and alief
 alongside these philosophers and attitudes just cited. What distinguishes
 these states from being belief that P cannot simply be the way that they
 motivate behaviour, since, by stipulation, they motivate the same behaviour
 (namely "P- concordant' ' behaviour). What makes these states differ from
 beliefs is that belief has a certain relationship to evidence (it is, as Gendler
 puts it, reality-sensitive) that these other states lack. At this point it should be
 clear that accepting that belief requires a certain relationship to evidence,
 and not simply action, amounts to giving up the downstream-only view of
 belief. And, of course, that is the view that I am trying to defend.
 I will respond to the objections from imagination and from alief in
 reverse order, so, starting with alief. The same central principle guides
 my responses to both, namely, an important distinction between action
 and behaviour.
 V.3. Responses to Objection 2: Action and Mere behaviour
 Let Gendler have aliefs, and let's suppose that they are worth posit-
 ing. What is my response to her critique of "Neo-behaviorism"? Firsdy, a
 note on "Neo-behaviourism." If by "Neo-behaviourism" she means
 simply "behaviourism that happens to be held today", then I would not
 call the downstream-only view, "behaviourism". And yet, I entirely agree
 that her characterization of "Neo-behaviourism" (see quotation above) is
 the downstream-only view. So what's going on?
 Behaviourism, as Chisholm (1957) righdy pointed out, is a reductive
 project. It aims to rephrase, salva ventate ^ claims about the mental in terms
 of claims about the non-mental, and, in particular, the behavioural. Thus,
 claims about belief are rephrased ("analysed", if you will) in terms disposi-
 tions to behaviour. However, the downstream-only view is not a reductive
 enterprise in this sense at all. We are not concerned here, for example,
 with a metaphysical project of trying to accommodate the mental in a
 physical world. We are simply trying to state the necessary conditions for
 someone to count as a believer. Thus we rephrase claims about believing
 in terms of claims about action. But action is a mental phenomenon. We are
 not being reductive. We are elucidating one mental phenomenon in terms
 of another mental phenomenon. We are picking out necessary relations
 between them. Well, what is the purpose of this here? So that we can tell
 when someone appears to be believing something when in fact they are
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 not. To take an analogy, saying that, by knowing what someone desires
 and how they are disposed to act, you can ascertain what they believe, is
 like saying that you can ascertain velocity from knowing distance covered
 and time taken. That is not a reduction. It does not "reduce" velocity to dis-
 tance and time any more that one can "reduce" distance to velocity and
 time. You may have views about which is metaphysically more fundamen-
 tal, but the relations between the phenomena will hold independendy of
 this. Similarly, you may think that action has metaphysical primacy, or that
 belief has, or desire has. But that is a different issue.
 Now note that Gendler's charaterization of "Neo-behaviourism"
 isn't reductive either. In it, she talks of disposition to action. But then she
 goes on to talk about P-concordant behaviour. She slips from talk of ac-
 tion to talk of behaviour, without marking the difference. And yet there
 is an enormous difference. If she had characterized neo-behaviourism in
 terms of behaviour it would be reductive and, I agree, erroneous. How-
 ever, action is, at least in part, individuated by intention, not by mere
 bodily motion. Although there has been a great deal of debate surround-
 ing the precise individuation conditions of actions, here we only stricdy
 need to note something that all views agree on: that the same bodily mo-
 tions performed with different intentions are different actions. Behaviour,
 on the other hand, is individuated by bodily motion. A result of this is that
 two identical pieces of outward behaviour can be different actions. They
 will be different actions if the intentions are different, and the intentions
 will be different if the beliefs or desires are different. We can contrast
 cases where intentions are lacking, or when they are different.
 Suppose, in Scenario 1, John kills (in a neutral sense of being caus-
 ally implicated in his death) James, because Joe, who wanted to frame
 him, implanted a microchip in his brain and controlled his behaviour. In
 Scenario 2, John kills James as a way of exacting revenge. We can stipu-
 late that the outward behaviour is the same in both scenarios. However,
 the two scenarios are very different. In Scenario 1, we wouldn't think of
 John's causing of James's death as an action, at least not John's action.
 We might even plausibly call it Joe's action. This would be reflected in
 our moral and legal practices. Given all the relevant information, we
 would blame Joe for James's death and charge him with murder. In Sce-
 nario 2, we simply have the straightforward action of John murdering
 James. So, actions are different actions (sometimes, as we saw, attributa-
 ble to different individuals) if the intentions are different. Bodily move-
 ment, without any intention, fails to be action at all.
This content downloaded from 144.173.224.37 on Wed, 17 Oct 2018 10:58:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 30 Sam Wilkinson
 One query, worth addressing now, however, is: how do we make
 space for the notion of unintentional action? This doesn't seem like a
 contradiction in terms, and yet it seems that on the view just sketched,
 this is ruled out. In order to respond to this, it is important to distinguish
 the action, from the way the action is described. As Davidson (1980) in-
 fluentially put it, in order for something to be an action, it has to be "in-
 tentional under some description". Thus, to take an example from Searle
 (1983), it seems intuitively plausible that Oedipus's marrying J ocasta is an
 action. An action performed with the intention of marrying a beautiful
 woman whom he loved. It was not performed with the intention of mar-
 rying his mother, although that is de facto what he did. So we might say
 that he unintentionally married his mother. However, note that it would
 fail to be an action at all if there was no description under which it was
 intentional. Due to our ignorance, we often perform actions successfully,
 but with unintended consequences.
 So here is my diagnosis of what aliefs show for the downstream-
 only view. Gendler is right to say that these states are not beliefs. How-
 ever, this is not, as she says, because they are not supported by evidence
 or inflexible in the face of contrary evidence. There are, as I argue (and
 as Bortolotti (2009) was at pains to point out) many beliefs that are re-
 sistant to correction (although they should only be thought of as beliefs
 if the subject is disposed to act on the in the right way). Aliefs fail to be
 beliefs - or rather, subjects in the examples do not believe the "content
 of the alief ' - because these states causally explain behaviour rather than ra-
 tionally explain action. Aliefs are affective states that interfere with people's
 intentions and actions, rather than taking part in them in the way that be-
 liefs typically do. The person reluctant to walk on the walkway, wants to
 walk on the walkway, believes that it is safe, but is hindered by a strong
 sense of fear. The person reluctant to drink from the bedpan [Gendler
 (2008a), p. 636], may want to drink from the bedpan (presumably the
 experimenter gives them some incentive to do so), believes that it is safe
 to do so, but is hindered by a strong feeling of disgust.
 Now let's look at imagination. As we saw, Gendler's objection to
 "Neo-behaviorism" is confusing the individuation conditions of action
 and mere behaviour. The same response applies here. Part of what
 makes something imagination or make-believe, rather than belief, is not,
 as Currie emphasizes, that it's not responsive to epistemic reasons, but
 rather that the action on the basis of which you ascribe the merely imag-
 inative episode in question is different from the action on the basis of
 which you would ascribe a state of believing (even if the behaviour is su-
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 perficially the same). An actor on stage who runs away from something
 dangerous in the play doesn't believe that he is in danger, but rather be-
 lieves that he is acting in a play, wants to give the audience the impres-
 sion of being in danger, and believes that this is how that's done. He
 therefore isn't literally performing the action of running away from dan-
 ger, however convincing he may be in his acting. Performing the action
 of running away from danger requires that one have the belief that one is
 in danger. Otherwise one is not performing that action, but merely some-
 thing that superficially resembles it.
 VI. Conclusion
 In this paper, I presented a downstream-only view of belief, accord-
 ing to which there can, indeed, be belief without evidence. This neither
 depended on there actually being cases of belief without evidence (alt-
 hough I'm sure there are such cases), namely, it was a mainly conceptual
 rather than empirical exploration. Nor was it dependent on our intuitions
 about whether we'd be happy to attribute belief in such cases, namely,
 the view is revisionist, not conservative. For example, the view would
 lead to revisions in cases where people make sincere assertions, but do
 not act in accordance with those assertions. Although I haven't the space
 to elaborate on these example, this could be due to a lack of self-
 knowledge, lack of linguistic knowledge, or lack of understanding. Sever-
 al of our so-called "beliefs" fall short of actually being beliefs, but that is
 because we do not, and sometimes cannot, act upon them. It is not be-
 cause they lack evidence.
 Department of Philosophy
 Durham University
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 Notes
 * This paper was a finalist entry at the 2014 teorema Essay Prize for
 Young Scholars on "Belief Without Evidence".
 1 She is open to thinking about propositions in terms of possible worlds.
 But although her view has all the same consequences of such a view, she claims
 that she is more comfortable with the vocabulary of states of affairs.
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 2 Note, also, the potential implications for philosophy of mathematics:
 when a mathematician makes a mistake, we intuitively say that they used to be-
 lieve so ething that was impossible (namely a mathematical falsehood). This is
 ruled out by such a view.
 3 Whether informational states in an artificial system, i.e. a robot, can be
 thought of as beliefs is an interesting question, but one that is not stricdy rele-
 vant for our purposes. I would suggest that good reasons for opposition to this
 view would not be something intrinsic to the informational states themselves,
 but rather because the goals are not theirs. They are the goals of the program-
 mer. Artificial systems only have derived goals, namely, the goals of their crea-
 tors. Evolved beings have goals of their own.
 4 What Ramsey meant by "we" is not entirely obvious. He could have meant
 "human beings". I'd like to think (and it fits in with his view, and the apparent
 modal strength of his claim) that he meant "any beings capable of belief'.
 5 Austin used it as a way of explaining different ways of asserting Fa (and
 given this difference, the logical form is insufficient to capture it). This is seen
 most clearly when we assert something of the logical form Fa which is false.
 Compare wrongly calling a triangle a square, which is "committing an act of vio-
 lence to the language", with wrongly describing a triangular object as being
 square, which is "committing a act of violence to the facts". This difference is
 explained in terms of direction of fit since in the former the fault is in "fitting a
 name to the item", whereas in the latter it is in "fitting the item to the name".
 6 Beliefs with modal or normative content may be hard to capture in literal
 maps, for example. However, they only qualify as beliefs if they guide my ac-
 tions, and in this respect are map-like. If I truly believe that it might rain, I will, ce-
 teris paribus, bring my umbrella. If I truly believe that killing babies is very
 wrong, I will, ceteris paribus, refrain from doing it. Perhaps, in any case, we can
 make sense of maps with normative and odal content. A street on a map with
 an arrow indicating one-way traffic has normative content. One with a warning
 sign that flooding at high tide is a risk has modal content (of sorts).
 7 Indeed it is not clear whether in this sense these states have an essential
 direction of fit at all - they may have elements of a mind-to-world direction of
 fit, to the extent that they have elements of beliefs to the extent that they are used
 as information.
 8 See also Moore's famous paradox. Although the point is very similar,
 however, it is phrased in semantic rather than epistemic terms.
 9 Velleman uses "transparency" to refer to a different phenomenon. He
 claims that the question "Whether to believe that p" is, "transparent to", name-
 ly, answered by answering the question "Whether p". We might call this delibera-
 tive transparency. The transparency I am talking about here is what we might call
 transparency of self attribution. The later tells us something more fundamental about
 the nature of belief. Furthermore, although I don't need to get embroiled in this
 tricky debate, I don't agree with deliberative transparenty since I don't believe in
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 doxastic deliberation , namely, we never ask whether to believe that p, since belief is
 involuntary in the strongest sense (due to its nature, and in all possible worlds).
 10 Although in everyday speech, people talk about "beliefs" as the incon-
 clusively supported commitments that help to define them as a person: e.g. "I
 stand by my beliefs". This is clearly not what I mean. People may well be asking
 questions about themselves when asked what they "believe" in these cases.
 11 I mean "doing" in the weakest sense. It does not imply action or inten-
 tionally doing something.
 12 The parenthesis "or wrong in such a way" is to highlight that one might
 not think of this as a matter of degree. Some theorists, in a way analogous to
 asking "How irrational must one be in order to count as delusional?" may ask:
 "How irrational must one be in order for one to fail to be a believer?" Others,
 righdy in my opinion, will see the believing/ not-believing boundary as a differ-
 ence in type rather than degree.
 13 Wedgwood (2002), for example, uses the chess analogy.
 14 This analogy with chess, however, has limited utility and it is important
 to locate where the analogy breaks down. Belief is like chess in that it is subject
 to norms; some of the norms will be essential to what belief is, others will fea-
 ture in evaluations of beliefs. In both cases, the constitutive norms being ad-
 hered to are a precondition of the evaluative norms coming into play. A move
 obviously can't be a bad chess move if it's not a chess move at all. And the same
 goes for belief. But the parallel stops there. Disanalogies, for example, include
 the fact that chess is a game, the playing of which is utterly deliberate. A move
 in chess is an action , rendered intelligible by beliefs and goals (by informational
 and motivational states). Given this fact about chess, you can deliberately play
 badly if your goal is to do so. As we will see, it is not obvious that this can be
 said of belief, at least not direcdy.
 15 As we will see in the next chapter, for me, this would be not the im-
 planting of a discrete sentence-like entity, but the "implanting" (or, better, instil-
 ling) of a particular disposition to action.
 16 Some would say that you needn't go as far as farfetched thought exper-
 iments: the brain-washing of extremist cults, for example, is behaviour-driving
 in the worst ways (e.g. suicide bombing), but the belief-formation process is far
 from rational.
 17 There is an illustrative limit to the map/belief analogy. Maps are typical-
 ly things that you deliberately use to help you navigate. Beliefs are not things that
 you user, they are things that you have when you are in the process of navigating.
 Thus, it is more helpful to think of maps in the analogy as models rather than as
 literal maps . In other words, the subject isn't going through a process of using
 something map-like to navigate. Rather, the agent's informational state, as mani-
 fested in her goal-directed navigations, can be modelled (roughly, helpfully de-
 scribed) in terms of something map-like.
 18 This regulative truth aiming may, however, be a constitutive norm for a
 more active evidence-gathering process, like "inquiry". In a strong, but not out-
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 landish sense of "inquiry", somebody who treats evidence in a biased way may
 not be inquiring badly, but failing to inquire at all. Is someone who plays chess,
 put tries to lose, playing chess or not? Well, yes and no. This is not a substantive
 issue, but a terminological one: do you include the attempt to win in the concept
 of "playing chess"? Does it matter either way?
 19 As Velleman (2000) puts it, unlike imagining, "belief is the state that
 goes right or wrong by being true or false".
 20 And arguably this is captured in the metaphor of "aiming".
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